INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate a class of games in which each player accumulates some form of capital. The payoff of each player depends on his own capital and the capital stocks of his rivals. Changes in stock, however, are not instantaneous. The firm can invest in the capital stock and it deteriorates at a certain constant proportional rate. Each player thus chooses a path of investment and thus an induced path of capital accumulation so as to maximize his total discounted profits.
The first issue in such a game is the problem of existence of paths which form a Nash solution, i.e., given the paths of the rivals, the firm's strategy is the best response for these paths.
When the existence issue is solved, the main issue is whether such markets have a stationary equilibrium and whether the market will converge to the stationary point. It is straightforward to show that even if a stationary equilibrium path exists, in the finite horizon case the market will not converge to the stationary equilibrium point. Thus the issue of convergence necessitates introducing infinite horizons. To clarify the economic situations of our games, the following are examples that fall into our general class. market. Firm i can change its stock of durables, Q,(t), by producing x(t) units at time t and its stock depreciates at a constant rate of 6. Thus its equation is Q, = xi -6,Qi. Its revenues at time t are given by p(Qi + Q2) Qi and its cost of production is C,(x). EXAMPLE 2 (Advertising and goodwill). Consider a market in which the firms accumulate goodwill Gi according to the Nerlove-Arrow equation 6, = ai -diGi, were ai is the advertising investment and 6, the depreciation due to forgetting and other reasons. Sales of firm i will be some concave function of its relative market share. Price will be determined by a Cournottype solution. Thus the revenues of firm i is given by &(Gi/zj Gj) for some concave function fi. This subject is dealt with separately by the authors [lOI* This work is an extension of two separate lines of research: capital accumulation and differential games.
The capital accumulation equation which is used in this paper was originally investigated by Nerlove and Arrow [20] . Arrow [I, 21 has generalized his original findings by considering two extensions: the first considers a general decay which is not necessarily exponential, and the second considered a nonstationary economic environment. Gould [ 131, by considering the model of Nerlove-Arrow with strictly convex cost has found that for any initial value of the stock of capital, there exists an initial investment such that the induced capital path converges to a stationary point.
At the same time a whole stream of related research began investigating the stability properties of capital accumulation growth models. In particular, the interest was in finding conditions under which a capital growth system would converge to a particular stationary point regardless of the initial conditions. Such a system was defined as having the global asymptotic stability property. See, for example, the special issue of J. Economic Theory (February 1976) and in particular Cass and Shell [6] and Brock and Scheinkman [5 1. The common type of condition that relates these works is that more than strict convexity (concavity) is needed. ' We are interested in extending the issue posed by Gould. His type of stability can be denoted by conditional global asymptotic stability which is weaker than global asymptotic stability since the path converges just for a particular initial condition of investment. In our game global asymptotic stability is ruled out since it can be shown that the game does not even ' A function f is more ccmvex than g if f -g is convex. The functions that are needed in these cases are functions which are more convex than quadratic function.
possess local stability. We do, however, investigate the issue of conditional local and global stability. In terms of differential games, we choose to formulate an open loop solution although it is known to have some limitations; see Spence [24] or Kydland [I?'] .' The closed loop solutions, however, are known to exist only with severe limitations on the structure and duration of the game, for example, Reinganum [21] . The existence issue for zero sum differential games has been extensively investigated. For a review and summary of this line of research, see Friedman [ 121. For open loop, nonzero sum, differential games, Scalzo [22] first proved existence for any finite duration. Proofs of existence prior to his work were known only for "small" duration. Scalzo's work has been extended by Wilson [26] and Williams 125) to games with incomplete information and by Scalzo and Williams [23] to games with nonlinear state equations. All three extensions dealt with the finite horizon case.
The issue of conditional local and global asymptotic stability of differential games has been recently investigated in three interesting papers: Brock [4], Flaherty [ 111, and Haurie and Leitmann [ 141. These works assumed the existence of a solution to the particular differential game investigated.2 Flaherty showed conditions for local stability of a linear--quadratic game. Brock and Haurie and Leitmann studied a family of games that is richer than the one studied in our work. Using the Lyapunov function they showed sufficient conditions for conditional global asymptotic stability for bounded solutions. The interesting point to observe is that in our setting, the same conditions that assure us of the existence of a solution and the existence of a unique stationary point are also sufficient for the existence of a solution that converges to the stationary point regardless of the initial conditions, i.e., they guarantee that the stationary point is conditionally globally asymptotically stable. Thus, in terms of contribution to differential games we first provide a simpler proof for a setting similar to Scalzo. Then we extend this result by proving existence to the infinite horizon case. Third, because of our method of proof we are able to show the convergence to a stationary equilibrium regardless of the initial stocks of capital. 
FORMULATION
We consider a game G with two players where the payoff for each player is its total discounted profits. Instantaneous profits depend on the firm's own capital stock as well as the capital stocks of its rivals. Capital stock Ki accumulates according to the Nerlove-Arrow capital accumulation equation
Where Zi is the investment in the capital stock Ki of firm i, and ai is the depreciation constant. The planning horizon is denoted by T.
To define a game we have to specify the strategy spaces S,, S, and the payoffs.
Player i's strategy is assumed to belong to the following set:
where Zi is given in Assumption 1. The payoff for firm i is defined by
where r is the discount rate, T might be finite or infinite, and C,(Z,) is the cost of investing Ii units. The instantaneous profit function ni(K,, K2) and cost function Ci(Zi) satisfy ASSUMPTION 2. r+(K,, K,) E C*, is increasing and strictly concave function of Ki, decreasing in Kj (for i # j, i, j = 1, 2), C,(Z,) E C*, is strictly increasing strictly convex, and C;(O) = 0 (for i = 1, 2).
It can be checked that the two examples given earlier can satisfy Assumption 2 (with respect to the revenue function). In Example 2 note that the revenue function will be increasing and concave in Gi if f is increasing and concave in its argument; see Fershtman [9] .
We consider an open loop differential game, i.e., the problem of player i is to maximize (.Zi) subject to his capital constraint given in (l), given Kj(t) for (j # i).
Define the game G(K,,, K,,, T) as the game with strategy spaces Si, payoff functions as in (2), time horizon T, and at t = 0, the game starts at the initial stocks of K,(O) = K, (i = 1, 2) and satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. Finally, let K, = (K,, , K,,). A Nash Equilibrium for the game G(KO, ?") (for T E [0, co)) is a pair of functions Z:(t), Z:(t) such that Z:(t) maximizes (2) subject to (1) given Z?(t) (i # j).
A Stationary Nash Equilibrium for G(K,, T) is a pair of values (I:, K:), (I,*, K?) such that ZT = s,KT and the pair (IF, I$) is a Nash equilibrium for the game G(KP, Kf, a).
We shall call a stationary equilibrium point (Kf, Kt) conditionally locally asymptotically stable if there exists a two-dimensional manifold S, containing (Kf, K:, ZT, If) such that for every (K,, K,, I,, I,) E S the solution of the game G which starts at (K,, K,, I,, I,) converges to the stationary equilibrium point.
We shall call a stationary equilibrium point (K,*, Kc) conditionally globally asymptotically stable if there exists a two dimensional manifold S, containing (K,*, Kf, ZT, Z,*) such that for every initial conditions KlO, K,, there exists a pair of initial investment I,,,, I,,, such that (KlO, K2,,,Z1,,,Z20) E S and the solution of the game G(K,,, K,,, a~) converges to the stationary equilibrium point (Kf, Kz).
FINITE TIME HORIZON
In this section we consider the game G(K,,, KzO, 7') for finite time horizon T.
We prove that for any K,, and any T, there exists a path (Ii(t), Z,(t)), such that this pair of functions is a Nash equilibrium for the game G.
Define the following family of functions
where C([O, T]) is the family of continuous, bounded function on [O, T].
Thus the family BLi is bounded by a common bound and is "equiLipschitz," i.e., all the functions of the family share the same Lipschitz constant. Furthermore, by applying the triangle inequality it is clear that BLi is closed since a converging sequence of equiLipschitz functions converges to a Lipschitz function with the same constant. Convexity can be shown in the same fashion.
For each strategy I,(t) E Sj define the induced capital path as K,(t) which is the solution of Eq. (1). Assumption (1) guarantees that Ii(t) is bounded by 4. Equation (1) ProoJ We first consider the unconstrained maximization in which Zi(t) is allowed to have negative values. What we show later on is that the optimal control is strictly positive for any t and thus the constrained and unconstrained maximization problems are equivalent. Consider the maximization problems for firm 1 in which the stock of player 2 is given by K,(t). The problem can be solved by using standard control theory.
Define the current value Hamiltonian to be Under Assumptions 1 and 2 the necessary conditions for optimality are sufficient as well since the Hamiltonian is concave in K, and I,. The necessary conditions are ;2,-r~,=-aH,/i-)K,=-an,/aK,+~,6,,
aH,/aZ, = 0 = -C;(z,) + I,.
The solution of Eq. (3) for 2 is given by
Since rci > 0, A is strictly positive. Therefore our assumption on the cost function C and Eq. (4) guarantee that Z(t) > 0. Solving Eq. (3) for A, (4) for Ii(t), substituting into (1) and solving for K,(t) yields
where < = K,, e-Sf, and rr: denotes &r, /aK, . We need to show that given a converging sequence K;(t)+ K;(t), the corresponding sequence K:(t) = #,(Ki(t)) satisfies K:(t) + KY(t), where K;(t) = $ww)).
Assume a contrario that K:(t) does not tend to KY(t). Without loss of generality (taking subsequence if necessary), we can assume that K:(t) + Z(t) but Z(t) #KY(t). From the fact that BLi is equilipschitz, it follows that the convergence of KY is uniform and thus this and the continuity of Cl and x: imply that Z(t) satisfies J(t) = < + I,' e-sl(f-s)(C;)-l n:(J(r), K;(s)) e-(rtG1)(r-S)dz ds. i
Since the solution of (5) is unique, it follows that Z(t) = KY(t). The fact that every converging sequence of KY converges to KY implies that K'f tends to KY. Note that the functions #i are not reaction functions since they are not defined on the strategy space but rather on the state path space. If firm 2 chooses a path of investment Z,(t) which induces a path of capital K*(t) then the optimal response of firm 1 will be to choose a path of investment such that the induced path of capital is gi(K,(t)). 
We make use of the Schauder-Tychonoff theorem which states that if A is a compact convex subset of a locally convex linear topological space then every continuous mapping from A into itself has a fixed point. Since C( [0, T]) is a Banach space, from Lemma 2, B,, x B,, is a compact convex subset of a locally convex space, from Lemma 1 the function 4 is a continuous mapping and thus 4 has a fixed point. This fixed point is a Nash equilibrium solution for the game G(K,, T).
Q.E.D.
The economic interpretation of Theorem 1 is that for every initial conditions K,, and K2,,, there exists a pair of strategies (IT(t), 1;(t)) such that: first, l:(t) is the best response for IT(t) and second, the induced capital paths K,*(t) start at Kio, for i = 1, 2.
In any such equilibrium, the assumptions of this model guarantee that both firms will be active. This can be seen by noting that 7ci(O, K,) > (r + 6,) Cl(O) and using Gould's argument. Moreover, the firm will find it optimal to invest at any time t. The formal argument is given in Lemma 3.2. The intuitive argument is as follows. Zero investment level cannot be optimal since the cost of investment C'(O) is zero and the benefit from investing in capital is always positive, i.e., nj(Ki. Kj) > 0.
INFINITE TIME HORIZON
In this section we prove the existence of a Nash solution to the game G(K,,, K,,, co) for every K,, and K,,. Replication of the finite time horizon proof is not possible. To see this note that we have defined a family of Lischitz functions BLi([O, T]). Then we defined mappings oi which, we were able to show, were continuous. Using this continuity and the compactness of BLi( [0, T]) we were able to make use of the Tychonov theorem. In the infinite case, BLi([O, cc))) is not compact. We therefore modify BLi in a way to achieve compactness, and retain continuity.
Define the following family of functions From the definition of BLi([O, T]) ( see Section 3) it is evident that due to the fact that B,, is equilipschitz, for every finite T there exists a collection E as required. Since the functions in BLi([O, co)) are bounded by Ki, for every given E > 0, let T be such that e -'r2Ki < E. For this T define the collection E' as {E, ,..., E,, E,+I}, where E,+l = [T, co). It is clear that, for i = l,..., 12 + 1, and mi E Ei, and thus .R,, is conditionally compact. It is cumbersome but straightforward to check that QLi is closed and thus it is compact.
Define a function #i : BLj( [0, co)) + Bri( [0, co)) as the best induced capital path of player i for a given capital path of j as in Section 3. Define a function Bi : QLj -+ fiLi such that for every f E QLj 19,(f) = ecr'q5,(er'f).
The function 19~ is well defined since by definition of QLj, e'!f E BLj. In order to prove its continuity we need the following definition and lemma:
DEFINITION.
Let XnyX~, E BLi([O, a>>. x, -+* x0 iff for every finite T Sup,<, ]xn(t) -x,(t)1 + 0 as n + co. LEMMA 4.2. e-"x, + e-"x0 @TX,, -+* x0.
Proof. Clearly if e-"x, --t e -'lx0 then for every finite T suptGr le-"x, -e -% +n+c 0 and thus supoGIGr Ix,(t) -x,(t)1 +n+m 0. Conversely, since x, are bounded for every given E > 0, there is T, sufficiently large such that sup,> rI (e-"x, -e-"x0 I < s/2. For sufficiently large IZ, Sup,,,, lepr'xn --e -"*xoI < ~/2. Therefore for every E > 0, there is T, and sufficiently large N such that for every II > N, suptca: le-"x, -e-"x,1 < E.
ASSUMPTION 4. I # / is bounded, i.e., I $ < Li for some Li > 0 and C; is bounded from below, i.e., Cl' > q for some &i > 0. (7) are continuous with respect to the metric II f -gl/ = Sup, If(t) -g(t)l.
Proof. Using Lemma 4.2 we need to show that given a converging sequence K; +* Ki, the corresponding sequence KY = e*'e,(e-"KY) satisfies K: + * KY, where KY = erfel(e -"Kt). ' We are thankful to Dov Samet for pointing out this method of proof to us.
Without loss of generality, taking subsequences if necessary, we can assume that KY -+* J. We wish to show that J = KY.
The solution of KY(t) following the procedure outlined in Lemma 2 is (9) Note that the inner infinite integral is bounded by L/(r t S), where L is defined in Assumption 3.
Step 1. Observe the following expressions:
where J(r) is the value of the function J (the limit of Kf) at time r. For a given t, the difference between (10) Step 2. Define the following expressions:
e -S1(f-s)(C;)-l 11: 71:(J(7),K~ (7))e-"tSL"'-S' d7/ ds, The difference between (11) and (1 la) tends to zero as n + co. This is true since KY -+* J and by Assumption 4, [(Ci))']' and nil are bounded. Since (1 la) is identically zero, for a given t, by definition of KY, it follows that expression (11) tends to zero when n + 00.
Step 3. The second term in expression (11) tends to J and to expression (lOa) as n --t co. Thus ( 1)-' 0 11: n:(J(r), K:(t)) e-(r+dl)(r-s) d7/ ds since the solution of (9) is unique, it follows that J = KY. THEOREM 2. The dlgerential game W~ovKm ao> satisfying Assumptions 3 and 4 has a Nash equilibrium solution for any initial conditions K,, and K,,.
Proof. The proof follows the proof of Theorem 1, where RLi, Lemmas 4.1 and 4.3 replace BLi, Lemma 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM AND ITS PROPERTIES
In this section we show the existence of a stationary equilibrium, discuss the concept of a Nash equilibrium manifold and investigate the properties of the stationary equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 5.1 (Existence). Under Assumptions 1 and 2 there exists a stationary Nash equilibrium point (K,*, Kz).
Proof. Consider the maximization problem for firm in which the stock Kj of firm j is constant, i.e., K,(t) = xj. This problem can be solved using standard control theory as follows:
The necessary conditions are Ai -r& = -8Hi/aKi = -&ri/aKi + &Si,
aHi/Zi = 0 = -C;(Ii) + Li.
Differentiating Eq. (13) with respect to time, and substituting Ai and li from (12) and (13) The solution to Eqs. (14) and (1) can be depicted on the (Ki, Ii) phase diagram. It is straightforward to check that the phase diagram is as in Fig. 1 .
LEMMA 5.1. There exists a unique intersection point between pi = 0 and ii = 0, and this intersection is a saddle point.
Proof. The proof is straightforward.
See, for example, Gould (131.
It follows that given Kj(t) = gj for any initial point Ki(O) there exists a unique optimal path for firm i which converges to Ki. ii is thus the stationary optimal stock for firm i given K,(t) = gj.
The point at which both Eqs. (1) and (14) 
4 is a continuous function from a compact convex set into itself, thus using Brouwer fixed point theorem there exists K,*, Kz such that (K:, K2*) = QW,*,K:) = @~VW~ 42KY).
Thus K* = (K,*, Kz) satisfies the condition for a stationary Nash equilibrium point for the game G. Q.E.D.
Note that tii is not a best response or "reaction function." The function #i is not defined on the strategy space but rather on the state space. If firm 1 is at K,* for the rest of the game, only then the best strategy for player 2 is to converge to #*(Kf). Let xii denote a2z/8KiaKj.
The following assumption, in addition to Assumptions 1 and 2, are sufficient for uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium. FERSHTMANANDMULLER ASSUMPTION 5. Ttt(K1, K2), i = 1, 2, satisfy the following inequality for all K, and K,, n:'n:' > n:'n;' and zf ' # 0 for i = 1,2, and all K, and K,. Note that in the symmetric case when z1 = x2 = 7c, the assumption is a concavity assumption on 71.
PROPOSITION 5.2 (Uniqueness).
Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 5 the stationary equilibrium point is unique.
Proof. Since xii < 0, the sign of $[ is the same as the sign of rrf'. If rt:' and 7~:~ have opposite signs, the equilibrium point whose existence is guaranteed by Proposition 2 is necessarily unique.
If zi* > 0 for i = 1,2, then it is sufficient to prove that at any equilibrium point (4; I)' > 4;. Since d is the solution of (15), this last condition is equivalent to the following condition:
(6,(r + 6,) Cl' -n:')(d,(r + 6,) Cy -7~:~) > 7c:'n:'. (18) If, however, 7ri' < 0 for i = 1,2, then it suffices to show that (4;')' < 4;. As before, this is equivalent to condition (18) . Since Assumption 5 holds, then necessary (18) holds and the equilibrium point is unique.
Q.E.D. Proof: What we need to show is that the Jacobian matrix of the following system has two positive and two negative (real parts of the) eigenvalues at the equilibrium point.
K2=12-&K2, Pa>
Cri, = (r + 6,) C; -z:(K,, K2),
C;i, = (r + 8,) C; -n:(K,, K2).
If A is an eigenvalue, it is straightforward to check that A has to satisfy the following condition:
f(A) = +T;~/C;'C;. (20) Where such that (K, I) E S}.
We now have the following corollary: For every initial condition K, E K(S), the game G(K,, co) has a solution which converges to the stationary equilibrium point. To see this, note that by definition of K(S), for K, there exists a pair I,, = (Z,(O), Z,(O)) such that (KO, I,,) E S and therefore there exists a unique path which starts at (K,,Z,) and ends at (K*,Z*). Since along this path conditions (1) and (14) are satisfied for i = 1, 2 we only have to show that the transversality conditions are satisfied. It will then follow that Zi(t) is the best response for Zi(t) since Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee the sufficiency of the necessary conditions. The transversality condition for control problems with infinite horizons that were proven by Michel [ 181 are that the discounted Hamiltonian vanishes as t approaches infinity. This is satisfied in our case since the instantaneous profit function is bounded and at the stationary equilibrium ZT = aiKT and A is bounded.
Thus the manifold S can be described as a Nash equilibrium manifold since for any initial condition K,, in its projection there exist I, such that there exists a Nash solution to the game that lies on the manifold and converges to a steady state.
In the next section, we investigate the spanning range of this manifold (or its continuation).
CHARACTERIZATION AND CONVERGENCE OF THE NASH SOLUTION
In this section we investigate the properties of the Nash solution. In particular we examine its convergence properties.
The analysis involves phase diagrams where the boundaries are ProoJ What we have to show is that if one player converges to the stationary equilibrium point then the induced capital path of the best response of the second player will converge as well.
Step 1. Assume there exists a finite T such that K,(t) is monotonic on [T, co). We first claim that Ki(t) is either monotonic or single peaked on [T, a~). Consider Fig. 2 . For the path K,(t) to have an extremum point, it has to cross the ki = 0 line. Without loss of generality, we assume that the path is currently in region 2. Crossing from region 2 to region 1 is impossible. The only way to cross the Eii = 0 line is for the ii = 0 boundary to move "down" and to catch up with the path. Once it crosses the path, the latter is in region 3 and it can now cross the ii = 0 line to region 4. The path is now depicted in Fig. 3 . We now have to show that the path cannot have another extremum unless kj changes sign which cannot happen by our monotonicity assumption of step 1. The path cannot cross from region 4 to region 3, therefore the ii = 0 boundary which has moved down has to change its direction, catch up with the path so that the path will be again in region 1 and the intersection with ki = 0 will be made possible. The boundary ii = 0 is given by (Y + si) C,!(l) = rci(Ki, Kj). It can change direction only if ~j changes sign. Since our assumptions rule out going out of business (see our discussion in Secton 3) the path Ki does not tend to zero. By standard arguments (see, e.g., Gould) the path Ki does not tend to infinity. Thus it converges to a stationary equilibrium point. Its uniquenes guarantees that Ki(t) will converge to KP.
Step 2. Assume that there does not exist a finite T such that K,(t) is monotonic on [T, 00). Thus for any t, there exists r > T such that Kj(t) is an extremum point.
For a given path Kj(t), j = 1,2, define a cycle as the path of Kj(t) between two consecutive extremal points. Let the amplitude of a cycle be the difference between the maximum and the minimum of Kj(t) in the cycle. Note that the arguments in step 1 can now be applied to any cycle of Ki, i.e., ki cannot change sign more than once without kj changing sign at least once. Since Kj(t) tends to K,*, the amplitude of its cycles tend to zero as time tends to infinity. Using the phase diagram of Fig. 3, let ki be the level of capital at the intersection of the curve ii = 0 and the line ki = 0. Changes in Kj will induce changes in the ii = 0 and therefore in ii. Define the cycles and amplitude of ki as before. From Eq. (15) which describes pi as a function of Kj and the assumption that (,jjj is bounded, we conclude that since the amplitudes of the cycles of Kj tends to zero, so do the amplitudes of ki as time tends to infinity. In Fig. 3, let xi denote the level of capital when Ki achieves a minimum as depicted. Observe that necessarily Ri is smaller than Bi, since intersection cannot occur between zones two and one. Thus the ii = 0 curve has to be below the path for intersection to occur. Thus, the amplitudes of the cycles of Ki can be bounded using the amplitudes of the cycles of ii, which tend to zero. Thus, the amplitudes of the cycles of K,(t) tend to zero as well. The uniqueness of the stationary point guarantees that Ki(t) tends to K,+. THEOREM 3. The difJ'erentia1 game W,,-Km, a> satisfying Assumptions 3-5 has a Nash equilibrium solution that converges to the stationary equilibrium point for every initial codition K,, and K,, .
Proof. Let Lemma 6.1 assures us that the range of the function #i is Bzi. In the same fashion we can define Qp (as in Section 4). It can be verified that Qjr is conditionally compact (since it is a subset of a conditionally compact set) is closed and convex. Thus we can make use of the Schauder-Tychonov lixedpoint theorem.
The existence of the stationary manifold S guarantees that the only convergence to K,* and K$ is through the manifold. Thus a corollary of Theorem 3 is that if S' is the continuation of S on the (K,, KJ plane, S' spans the entire (K,, KJ plane. We thus have COROLLARY.
The stationary equilibrium point (Kc, K,*) is conditionally globally asymptotically stable.
The proofs of existence and global stability can be extended to the multifirm case. The extension to the multicapital case is considerably more difficult. In addition, we have shown existence only. Thus, it is possible that other Nash equilibria which are not globally stable exist as well.
